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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in this matter is
found in Section 78-2-2-2 (3) (3) (ii), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

Pursuant to Rule 14, Rules of the Utah Supreme

Court, Petition for Writ of Review from the final decision of
the above-referenced matter of the Tax Commission of Utah:
Hansen, Chairman, has been properly

R.H.

filed within the time

required by Rule 14(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
No other claims remain to be determined in these proceedings and
appeal is taken to this Court.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This appeal is from the formal Decision of the State
Tax Commission of Utah wherein said Commission granted a
property tax preference to Kennecott Corporation and reduced the
value of 3,990 acres of property owned by Kennecott to its value
for agricultural purposes.

The property was leased to Hercules,

Inc., for a buffer zone around its manufacturing plant and was
also leased for grazing and for the growing of red winter wheat.
The Tax Commission decision was issued on September 10, 1987.
Petition for Writ of Review was filed bv appellant, Salt Lake
County, on October 8, 1987.

Writ of Review was issued by the

Supreme Court on October 8, 198 7.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether or not the use of the subject property in the

manner set forth in the lease between Kennecott Corporation and
Hercules Corporation in conjunction with its rocket and munitions manufacturing plant and used as a buffer zone with regard
to said plant, allows said property to be assessed as agricultural property by virtue of the fact that said property is also
leased for use as grazing and ground to grow red winter wheat.
2.

Whether or not assessment of property under the

Farmland Assessment Act is a limited tax exemption and should be
narrowly construed.
3.

Whether or not Utah Code Annotated Section 59-13-73

(now 59-4-101) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1987, is
applicable if the Tax Commission assessment as farmland is
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Salt Lake County, during tax year 1985,
assessed the property that is the subject matter of this appeal.
Subject property consists of approximately 3,990 acres surrounding a munitions and rocket motor manufacturing plant being
constructed by Hercules.

The subject property is leased to

Hercules by Kennecott as a buffer zone, required by Federal and
State law.

Of that acreage, Petitioner also leases approximate-

ly 1,500 acres to Don Rushton who grows red winter wheat on the
property, and leases the remainder of the subject property plus
several thousand other acres to Johnson Cattle Company, which
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raises cattle on the property.

The Salt Lake County Board of

Equalization determined that the property that was leased to
Hercules Corporation and used in conjunction with the munitions
manufacturing and rocket motor manufacturing facility was not
subject to assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act, but was
rather subject to assessment at fair market value as is all
other tangible property

located within the State of Utah.

Thereafter, Kennecott Corporation filed a Notice of Appeal to
the Utah State Tax Commission.

The Utah State Tax Commission,

on the 3rd day of September, 1986, issued an informal decision
wherein it determined that the subject land was actively devoted
to agricultural use including the grazing of beef cattle and the
growing of grain crops, and that as such, the land was subject
to valuation under the Farmland Assessment Act, pursuant to
Section 59-5-90, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended.

The

Commission further determined that Hercules1 rights to the
subject property, under its lease with Kennecott, and the use
thereof by Hercules did not preclude assessment of the subject
property under the provisions of the Farmland Assessment Act.
Petitioner, Salt Lake County, filed a Petition for a Formal
Hearing, which hearing was held on the 30th of December, 1986.
Thereafter, on the 10th day of September, 1987, the Utah State
Tax Commission issued its Formal Decision determining that the
subject property should be valued as land qualifying for assessment under the Farmland Assessment Act, and directed the Salt
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Lake County Assessor to assess the property devoted to agricultural use and to continue assessing said property under the
Farmland Assessment Act until and unless the subject property
fails to meet any of the requirements of the Act.

Petitioner

thereafter filed a Petition for a Writ of Review v/hich Petition
and Writ were filed and issued on the 8th day of October, 1987.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The property that is the subject of this appeal is
located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and owned by Kennecott
Corporation and leased to Hercules, Inc.
The subject property consists of approximately 3,990
acres surrounding a manufacturing plant constructed by Hercules,
Inc., where products such as rocket fuels and motors are manufactured and where experiments may occur on other potentially
explosive materials.

(T-605-642) .

Because of the dangerous and

potentially explosive activities which are carried on at the
Hercules facility, federal, state and local laws require a
buffer zone around the Hercules facility where there may be no
other human habitation or human activities because of the
potential risk to human life and safety.

(T-359-541) .

There-

fore, Hercules, Inc., has entered into a 25 year lease of the
Kennecott

property

(T-605-642).

to provide

the required

buffer

zone.

In addition, Kennecott has also leased portions of

the same property to two separate farmers, Johnson and Rushton,
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on

two

separate

(T-587-590) .

agricultural

leases.

(T-346-353)

and

One for grazing and the other for the growing of

red winter wheat.

A comparison of the relevant provisions of

the three leases is as follows:
RUSHTON
LEASE

JOHNSON
LEASE

HERCULES
LEASE

Term of Lease:

1 year

1 year

2 5 years

Renewal Options:

1 year

1 year

15 years

Renewal at Option of:

Kennecott

Kennecott

Hercules

Total Term which
Lessee Can Mandate:

1 year

1 year

40 years

No

No

Right of First
Refusal:
Annual Lease
Agreement:
Termination Notice
by Lessor:

Yes

25% of Gross

$4,500.

$239,640.*

30 days

30 days

None for
40 years

* Plus annual adjustment based upon fluctuations in GNPPD.
Additionally, Hercules1 rights under its lease with
Kennecott entitles Hercules the right to prevent Kennecott from
leasing or selling the property to a party who would build a
habitable structure on the property.

(T-623-624).

The Tax Commission, on the 10th day of September,
1987, issued its formal decision and determined that the subject
property was land qualified to be assessed under the Farmland
Assessment Act, as property devoted to agricultural use.

The

Commission further directed the Salt Lake County Assessor to
assess the property as property devoted to agricultural use, and
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to continue assessing the property under the Farmland Assessment
Act until and unless the subject property fails to meet any of
the

qualifications

under

the

Farmland

Assessment

Act.

(T-44-52).
Petitioner, Salt Lake County filed its petition for a
Writ of Review on the 8th day of October, 1987.

(T-4-"7) . Said

Writ of Review was duly issued to the Clerk of this Court on
October 8, 1987.

(T-l-3).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The property owned by Kennecott Corporation and leased
to Hercules Corporation to facilitate the manufacturing of
rocket motors, fuels, and munitions, and upon which experiments
may occur on other potentially explosive materials which, by
Federal, State and local law is required to be maintained as a
buffer zone where there may be no other human habitation or
human activities because of the potential risk to human life and
safety, is not property qualified for preferential tax treatment
afforded under the Farmland Assessment Act which requires, as a
condition of such treatment that such property be "actively
devoted to agricultural use."

Therefore, said property should

be denied preferential tax assessment and should bear its fair
share of the tax burden and be assessed in the same manner as
other taxable property located within Salt Lake County.
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And, to

the extent the value and tax is exempted, the users thereof
should pay the privilege tax therefore.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPROXIMATELY 400 0 ACRES OF LAND LEASED
BY KENNECOTT TO HERCULES, INC., IS NOT "LAND
WHICH IS ACTIVELY DEMOTED TO AGRICULTURAL
USE" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE UTAH FARMLAND
ASSESSMENT ACT.
Section 59-5-89 (now 59-2-503), Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended, reads, in part, as follows:
"Value of Land actively devoted to agricultural use.
(1) For general property tax purposes and land subject
to the privilege tax imposed by section 59-13-73 owned
by the state or any political subdivision thereof, the
value of land, not less than five contiguous acres in
area, unless otherwise provided under subsection (2),
which has a gross income, not including rental income,
of $1000 per year, is actively devoted to agricultural
use, which has been so devoted for at least two
successive years immediately preceding the tax year in
issue, shall, on application of that owner, and
approval thereof as hereinafter provided, be that
value which such land has for agricultural use.
(Emphasis supplied.)
However, as a threshold requirement, the land for which the
preferential tax treatment is sought must be "actively devoted
to agricultural use."

(Emphasis supplied.)

Appellants assert

that the Kennecott-Hercules rocket and explosives buffer zone
that is the subject of this appeal fails to meet this threshold
requirement.
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This is a case of first impression in that there are
no other Utah cases that have interpreted the statutory language
of "actively devoted to agricultural use."
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

defines

"devoted" as, "To commit by solemn act," or "to give over or
direct to a cause, enterprise or activity."

It lists the words

"dedicate" and "consecrate" as synonyms and then indicates that
the word "Dedicate" implies solemn and exclusive devotion to a
sacred or serious use or purpose.
therefore respectfully

submitted

(Emphasis supplied.)
that the phrase

It is

"actively

devoted for agricultural use" as used by the Utah State Legislature signifies an intent on the part of the Legislature to
require that the tax preference be extended only to those lands
that are used nearly exclusively for agricultural purposes.
de minimus non-agricultural use should not disqualify
property from the preferential treatment.
case clearly demonstrate

A

the

The facts in this

that the non-agricultural use is

dominant rather than de minimus.

The use of the property in

this case is as a buffer zone for the Hercules rocket manufacturing facility and related Hercules activities.
dominant or exclusive use is industrial.
Hercules needed a buffer zone.
without it.

Its primary or

To build its plant,

Its plant could not exist

Federal, state and local laws would not allow the

plant to exist without the buffer zone.

The use is demonstrated

by the lease comparison set forth in the statement of facts.
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The rents received from the Rushton and Johnson agricultural
leases are less than five (5) percent of the rents received for
the Hercules industrial lease.

Rushton1s rent is twenty-five

(25) percent of gross production of red winter wheat.
the Johnson lease is $4,500. per year.
rent is $239,640. per year.

Pent from

The Hercules lease base

Hercules annual base rent is 5,333%

higher than the rent received on the Johnson lease.

The base

rent of the Hercules lease is adjusted each July based upon
fluctuations in the Gross National Product Price Deflation over
the base year of 1982.

In addition, Hercules pays all taxes and

assessments upon the property.

The length of time that the

agricultural leases can be mandated is less than three (3)
percent of the time that the Hercules industrial lease can be
mandated.
The lessor, Kennecott Corporation, can terminate the
Johnson lease upon thirty

(30) days notice.

Kennecott Corpo-

ration can terminate the Rushton lease upon thirty
written notice.

(30) days

Kennecott cannot terminate the Hercules Indus-

trial lease for forty

(40) years.

The Johnson and Rushton

leases are renewable each year only if Kennecott is willing to
renew them.

On the other hand, Kennecott must renew the

Hercules industrial lease for forty
elects to renew it.

(40) years if Hercules

Given the above facts, it is clear that the

subject property is actively devoted to an industrial use rather
than an agricultural use.
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This Court in Loyal Order of Moose, #259 -vs- County
Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P.2d (Utah 1982),
addressed the issue of whether certain property owned by the
Moose Lodge in Salt Lake City was used exclusively for charitable purposes.

In denying the exemption, the Court made the

following significant statements v/hich are equally applicable to
this case.

The Court therein at page 263 stated:

"Fe see wisdom in a rule which does not deny a tax
exemption to property which is used for charitable
purposes simply because there is a de minimus noncharitable use. The exemption need not be interpreted
as the law of the Medes and Persians. The intent of
Section 2, Article XIII to encourage charity is
preserved where inadvertent or extremely minor noncharitable uses of property do not foreclose an
exemption.
However, where the non-charitable use
rises to the level that it must be weighed against
charitable use in order to determine which use is
dominant, then clearly the non-charitable use is well
beyond the point of de minimus and should unquestionably preclude an exemption. (Emphasis added.)
On page 264 of that case the Court continued:
The constitutional exemption is to be strictly construed and the charitable use of the property must be
exclusive; however, a use of true minor import or a de
minimus use will not defeat an exemption. If there is
any separate part of the building occupied and used
exclusively for charitable purposes, that part qualified for exemption. (Emphasis added.)
******* ***

Therefore, under the rule that the charitable use must
be exclusive (previously explained in Part III of this
option), whether the non-charitable use was primary or
not primary is not the test. Clearly, the noncharitable use was not de minimus and the property
does not qualify for an exemption. (Emphasis added.)

10

While it might be argued that the constitutional
requirement of "used exclusively for" is narrower than the
statutory requirement of being "actively devoted to agricultural
use." the same reasoning is applicable.

An exemption from

taxation or a substantial reduction such as given for agricultural use is a tax preference.

The rules requiring strict and

narrow construction of tax exemption statutes should be equally
applicable to a substantial reduction in tax burden.

Both

reduce government revenues and both result in an increased
burden upon the already over-burdened taxpayers.

To qualify for

preferential assessment as agricultural land, the land must be
"actively devoted to agricultural use."

This would allow a de

minimus non-agricultural use to occur without endangering the
tax preference so long as the agricultural use was primary,
dominant or nearly exclusive.

Under this test, the Kennecott

property leased to Hercules does not qualify.
agricultural use is de minimus or secondary.
devoted use is industrial.

At best, the
Its dominate or

To impose a requirement that the

agricultural use of property must be primary, dominant or nearly
exclusive is consistent with the Utah cases dealing with property tax exemptions extended to religious and charitable properties under the Utah Constitution.

These exemptions are

strictly construed in favor of taxation and against exemption.
See Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah
1985).

It is also consistent with the position taken earlier by
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the Utah State Tax Commission in Judd v. County Board of
Equalization of Salt Lake County, Decision of Informal Hearing,
Appeals No. 85-1^38 thru 85-1750, decided April

2, 1986,

appended hereto as Addendum 2, wherein the Commission on page 3
thereof, ruled in part as follows:
"Once property has been severed, subdivided, and
improvements placed thereon, the greenbelt status
should be removed and roll-back taxes assessed according to statute because the primary purpose of the
ground is no longer for agricultural use, but for
resale." (Emphasis supplied.)
The primary purpose of the ground used by Hercules,
Inc., and leased from Kennecott is industrial.
zone.

It is a buffer

Additionally, this reasoning is consistent with the

decisions of other courts confronting the interpretation of
similar language in statutes.
In the case of Rushton Hospital, Inc., -vs- Riser, 191
So. 2d 665, (La. 1966), the Louisiana Constitution exempted from
taxation

"places devoted

to charitable undertakings."

The

Louisiana Court of Appeals held that it was the use of the
property that constituted the test, and that the term "devoted
to" connotates a setting apart, a dedication.

Based upon the

constitutional requirement of "devoted to" the Court held that:
"There must be evidence which establishes the
fact that the operation and use of the undertaking is
devoted exclusively to the performance of charitable
acts." (Emphasis added.)
In the case of Otis Lodge, Inc., -vs- Commissioner of
Taxation, 206 N.W. 2d 3, (Minn. 1972), the Minnesota Supreme
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Court dealt with a statute that taxes property at a lower rate
(Class 3) if it was "devoted to temporary and seasonal residential occupancy for recreational purposes."

The court therein,

at page 7, stated:
"Perhaps some attention should be given to the
use of the word "devoted" in the phrase we are interpreting. Does it mean, as used here, given "wholly
and completely" or "chiefly" to "seasonal residential
occupancy for recreational purposes?" Suppose the
owner of a non-commercial cottage uses it between
seasons for a few weekends to "get away from it all"
and not because of any particular recreational activity that could be termed seasonal. Should this minimum
use be grounds for denying that owner's real estate a
class 3 status? We think that the word "devoted means
chiefly and not wholly because we don't think the
legislature intended an absurd result. Furthermore,
the phrase "devoted to" clearly means the use to which
it is actually put, not the use or uses to which the
property may be put. (Emphasis added.)
In another Minnesota case involving the same statute
that was involved in the Otis Lodge case, supra, Wolf Lake Camp,
Inc., v. County of Itasca, 252 N.W. 2d 261, (Minn. 1977), the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that under the statute using the
term "devoted to" "the actual use of the real property must be
chiefly for" the use to which it must be devoted under the
statute.

The reasoning in Otis has been cited with approval by

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Complaint of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677 (C.A. 9th 1984).

See also,

Helgeson v. County of Hennepin, 387 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1986) .
The most comparable case is City of East Orange v.
Township of Livingston, 246 A. 2d 178, (N.J. 1968), where the
Superior

Court of New Jersey was
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faced with

a Farmland

Assessment statute nearly identical to the Utah statute.

The

New Jersey statutes were part of their Farmland Assessment Act
of 1964, and provided as follows:
"For general property tax purposes, the value of land,
not less than 5 acres in area, which is actively
devoted to agricultural or horticultural use which has
been so devoted for at lease the two successive years
immediately preceding the tax year in issue, shall, on
application of the owner, the approval thereof as
hereinafter provided, be that value which such land
has for agricultural or horticultural use." N.J.S.A.
54:4-23.2 (Emphasis added.)
"Land shall be deemed to be in agricultural use
when devoted to the production for sale of plants and
animals useful to man including but not limited to:
forages and sod crops; grains and feed crops; dairy
animals and dairy products; poultry and poultry
products; livestock, including beef cattle, sheep,
swine, horses, ponies, mules or goats, including the
breeding and grazing of any or all of such animals;
bees and apiary products; fur animals; trees and
forest products; or when devoted to and meeting the
requirements and qualifications for payments or other
compensation pursuant to a soil conservation program
under an agreement with an agency of the Federal
Government." N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.3
Land shall be deemed to be actively devoted to
agricultural or horticultural use when the gross sales
of agricultural or horticultural products produced
thereon together with any payments received under a
soil conservation program have averaged at least
$500.00 per year during the 2-year period immediately
preceding the tax year in issue, or there is clear
evidence of anticipated yearly gross sales and such
payments amounting to at least $500.00 within a
reasonable period of time." N.J.S.A 54:4-23.5
The land in question in that case was used primarily
as a Water Reserve and secondarily as agricultural property.
The contention of the property owner was:
The water Reserve is said to be "in agricultural use"
within the meaning of the act because it consists of
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pastureland and is used for the growing and sale of
hay, timber and cordwood from which East Orange
derives an annual income in excess of the statutory
minimum. It also is asserted tangentially that the
Water Reserve is entitled to farmland assessment
because it is under a federal soil conservation
program.
The Court therein stated that:
"The purpose of [The Farmland Assessment Act of 1964]
was to counter the adverse impact of property taxation
upon agriculture and to provide farmers with some
measure of tax relief."
Further, at page 189-190:
It was apparent that the main objective of the
proposed amendment was to enable and encourage farmers
to continue to farm their land in the face of dwindling farm incomes and mounting costs, not the least of
which was sharply increasing real estate taxes.
Senate Committee on Revision and Amendment of Laws,
Public Hearing, "Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 16,
etc."
(April 15, 1963).
There were also other
incidental, beneficent purposes anticipated by its
proponents, such as fostering agriculture in the State
for the good of the general economy, ameliorating
problems of urban growth in rural municipalities, and
encouraging the preservation of open spaces. Id., pp.
5, 11-13, 16, 33-35. But, as noted, the primary
objective was to save the "family farm" and to provide
farmers with some economic relief by permitting
farmlands to be taxed upon their value as on-going
farms and not on any other basis.
The relevant portions of the holding are then stated
at page 191 of the decision, wherein it is stated:
Moreover, even if a municipal watershed were
within the ambit of the Farmland Assessment Act of
1964, the agricultural activities undertaken on the
East Orange Water Reserve would not qualify these
lands for taxation as farmlands. The pointed inquiry
on this hypothesis is whether, by virtue of the
activities relating to the sales of hay, timber and
cordwood, it can be said that the East Orange Water
Reserve is "actively devoted" to "agricultural use"
within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.5. Even though
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the agricultural use is "active" in the literal sense
that East Orange has realized income in excess of $500
per annum for the past two years from the sale of
timber, cordwood and hay (N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.5), compliance with this single criterion does not per se render
the Water reserve as land "devoted" to agricultural
use. To be "in agricultural use" under the act, land
must actually be "devoted to the production for sale
of plants * * * useful to man, including but not
limited to * * * trees and forest products * * *.."
It may be accepted that trees and forest products are
a derivative of the East Orange Water Reserve. It
does not follow therefrom that the East Orange Water
Reserve is devoted to the production for sale of its
trees and forest products.
* * * * *

In brief, the term "devote" must be understood in
its usual significance and in a manner which will
sensibly effectuate the salient statutory objective of
providing tax relief with respect to lands committed
to farming.
The verb "devote" denotes variously "1, * * * to
set apart or dedicate by a solemn act; to consecrate;
* * * 2. to give up wholly; to addict; to direct the
attention of wholly or chiefly." A synonym is "to set
apart" or "to appropriate," An equivalent verb is "to
dedicate," Webster's New International Dictionary
(1948 ed.), 715.
All of the experts recognize that there can be
multiple uses of woodlands or forests, which could
include or combine the production o^ water, wood,
recreation, education and the like. Depending upon
the particular lands involved, one use tends to become
dominant. The principal use of the East Orange Water
Reserve is a watershed. Any commercial gain from the
sale of hay, timber or wood is merely an incidental
by-product of the maintenance of the Water Reserve
woodlands. The management of the forest, including
the planting, harvest and removal of trees, is for the
essential purpose of encouraging the recharge and
replenishment of the under-ground wells. As far as
the state program is concerned, the cutting plan f or
trees is not for the purpose of producing lumber
commercially but with a view towards the primary use
of lands as a watershed. Consequently, from any
vantage point, the agricultural uses of the Water
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Reserve must be regarded as subservient to its dominant use as a public water supply.
In no sense,
therefore, can it be said that the East Orange Water
Reserve is devoted, that is, committed, or dedicated,
or set apart or appropriated, or given up wholly or
chiefly to the production for sale of agricultural
products of any kind within the meaning of the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964. To the contrary, it is
devoted to the purpose for which it was originally
acquired by East Orange, namely, for the purpose and
the protection of a public water S U D D I V .
(Emphasis
added,).
". . /u^v. L _._. r Court's rulinrr .n The City -;-t East Orange
V,T

*~ase was ~:ff:rrcd

the Purreme •',.^irj <~

n

of ^ast
~* - -

*h*

*^-*aIly ar.alccroiu:

•

Lna':k

c:r.

face

-

-_:.courage

-

•.

farmer?

*~

* :ic
T

-

AtiHiian . ^s^os::^;1- ,\. •
lerisl at: **e :.r.-er/ .
intent.

. :

i

Pather,

^

incustria . u:__ t:.a;; : .;: 'v.::- :,-_
property

leased

~:"ire

. : *--- ^

J

;'

x

*^

^ , , ^ 4.,._ 1

•

• .

sense

c a r M>~ larv- P e s a i d

tf^r|

' •

"pdica^ed,

4

If
M

'^ v :e " d e v o t e d

" • • > * * • •*- ->^-j v- +•

17

the
the

• f that

^ -.. ,

"he

le^'cttd

to

i_u^ < - 1C|
'

in

ii*_..-r that

vr.^riu ^

"artivelT7

l^rrnlei
i a r

,.

I1 , :

E•

land

costs.

*-- ' ' be ... ^inla^ic*

., • 1 - *

,. , . *

* -- :

v\.*

City

Assess-

'
e

1 S 69)

. v. , t i s e y

*\i;;r

*

. -

1

*-

**.'

continue-

- ' - -.

*

-ah Farmland

1.r dwi^dl : r.c *\vxi income arc1 rn ': t : r ^

'arr

• -r-J.:

"ew JerseT.T :~ City of
'

"Te purensf- r-r * • • > •

ranae c a s e .

v

^ ._ ^J-^i

::ast O r a — ^ • « :^-n = ri :
This Ker.necc + +- case is

c

- _

agricu"IUU£

+ uo

1 USP .

t o , "that

--^ imv-,- - ^^ -;^-,-.;

-r

no

"T-mr;„ v-

products" of any kind within the meaning of the Farmland Assessment Act. "
In addition, even though it is acknowledged that the
agricultural use of Kennecott's land is active use and that it
meets the minimum income requirements, that does not per se
render the land as "devoted to agricultural use."

In this case,

the chief, dominant and primary use of the land is the Hercules
industrial lease.

The agricultural leases are so secondary and

incidental as to only be a de minimus use of the property.

The

land is devoted to, dedicated to, committed to, given over to,
and consecrated to the Hercules lease and not the agricultural
leases.
Florida, a state with much agriculture and much real
estate development has enacted a tax preference in favor of
agricultural use.

"The purpose of the agricultural tax prefer-

ence was based upon the legislative determination that agriculture cannot reasonably be expected to withstand the tax burden
of the highest and best use to which such land might be put."
See Straughn v. E.K. Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421, (Fla.
1976) at page 424.
In Florida, agricultural use is ascertained with
reference to the amount of money that could be invested with a
reasonable expectation of an annual return to the owner similar
to what he would gain from other commercial enterprises with
similar risks, liquidity, degree and level of management.
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How

does the $239,640,000. annual base rent from Hercules, Inc., for
a buffer zone compare to the $4,500. annual rent received from
Johnson?

The Hercules industrial rent is over 5000% more per

year than the Johnson agricultural rent.

Could Kennecott

reasonably expect to receive $239,640,000. per year from grazing
or from growing wheat?
In Markham v. Nationwide Development, 349 So.2d 220
(Fla. 1977), the property owner sued to overturn the assessor's
determination that its property was not agricultural land for
purposes of tax preference.

Under Florida law there is a

statutory presumption that a sale of land for a purchase price
that is three or more times its agricultural assessment creates
a presumption that the land is not used primarily for bona fide
agricultural

purposes.

In

sustaining

the

assessor's

determination to deny tax preference the District Court of
Appeals observed at page 222 as follows:

"Even without the

statutory presumption of Section 193.461 (4) (c), the facts of
this

case

justify

the

Property

Appraiserfs

denial

of

Nationwidefs application for agricultural classification."
* * * * *

"Good faith commercial agricultural use of the land
requires more than mere agricultural use. First
National Bank of Hollywood v. Markham, 342 So.2d 1016
(Fla. 4th DCA 1977). To be a good faith commercial
agricultural use, there must be at least a reasonable
expectation of meeting investment lost and realizing a
reasonable profit."
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In North Carolina the agricultural tax preference is
based upon present use.

In ascertaining present use of the

land, the focus is also upon the owner and its source of income.
In W.R. Co. v. North Carolina Property Tax Commission, 269
S.E.2d 636 (N.C. 1980) f the only sources of income the property
owner had was from the sale of real estate, agricultural rents
for lands and allotments, and for one year only, the sale of
crops.

The Court denied the preferential tax treatment because

as a corporation, the owner failed to meet the definition of a
qualifying corporation for "present use" valuation purposes.

In

looking at the source of income of the corporation, the Court
concluded that the farm-related income constituted only a minor
fraction of the corporation's total income and therefore denied
the tax preference.

Admittedly, the test in Utah focuses upon

the use of the property.

However, the manner in which the

corporation is chartered gives insight into how it uses its
property to derive its income.

Kennecott is a mining company.

It makes its money recovering gold, silver, copper and other
minerals.

It also makes money from renting the surface of

mining properties such as those rented to Hercules.

There is no

evidence in the record to show it derives its income from
agriculture.

In W.R. Co., the Court reviewed statutes granting

preferential treatment in 35 other states.

It also reviewed

several law review articles and at page 643 of the opinion made
the following helpful observations:
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"It is an unfair subsidization of farmers and land
speculators who are not in need of tax shelter. See
Carman & Poison, Tax Shifts Occurring as a Result of
Differential Assessment of Farmland:
California,
1968-69, Nat'l Tax. J. 449, 455 (1970). Second, the
use valuation method does not really preserve prime
agricultural land near urban cities for any great
length of time but instead extends development speculation for a short period of time. Henke, Supra, at
123-24. Third, the tax base is reduced placing an
undue burden on those holding nonagricultural land to
make up the deficit, and the tax penalties and recaptures on sale in effect benefit a land speculator who
can use them to reduce his ordinary income and
capitals gains from sale in the year in which he makes
the sale."
How does the property owned by Kennecott and leased to
Hercules promote and preserve farming.

Is a commercial, long-

term, industrial lease with adjustments based upon the Gross
National Product Production the use that the Legislature had in
mind?

Absolutely not.

This is abuse that does violence to the

intent of the people of the State of Utah when they approved the
constitutional amendment to allow preferential assessment for
farmland, and contrary to the intent of the legislature when it
sought to implement the constitutional provision.

This Court

should not perpetuate the abuse of the tax preference given to
legitimate farming enterprise.

The preference given Kennecott

and Hercules by the Tax Commission should be reversed and set
aside.

POINT II
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FULL VALUE ASSESSMENT
AND THE PREFERENTIAL ASSESSMENT GIVEN TO
QUALIFYING FARM LAND CONSTITUTES AN
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EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION AND THE USE OF SUCH
EXEMPT PROPERTY IN THIS CASE IS SUBJECT TO
THE PRIVILEGE TAX.
Section 59-13-73

(now 59-4-101) Utah Code Annotated,

1953, as amended 1987, provides in part as follows:

"(1) A tax

is imposed on the possession or other beneficial use enjoyed by
any person of any real or personal property which for any reason
is exempt from taxation, if that property is used in connection
with a business for profit."

Therefore, to be subject to the

privilege tax, the following requirements are necessary:
(1)

Real or personal property;

(2)

Possession

or other beneficial

use enjoyed by

any

person of any real or personal property;
(3)

The property is exempt for any reason;

(4)

Used in connection with a business for profit.
If

Kennecott f s

real

property

is

assessed

at

its

farmland value, then the difference between what it would have
been assessed

(full value assessment), based upon highest and

best use, and the preferential assessment
is an exemption

from taxation.

(farmland assessment),

Since Hercules, Rushton and

Johnson are each engaged in business for profit, the privilege
tax would apply and they should be required to pay their proportionate share based upon their use of the exempted portion of
Kennecott f s property.

CONCLUSION
This Court has an opportunity to prevent what could
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become a very abusive use of the Farmland Assessment Act.
Act was passed with a specific purpose.

That

The purpose was to

preserve the opportunity for true agricultural users who were
actively engaged in agriculture to use the land for that purpose
without having the tax climate impact them to the point where
they could no longer afford to continue farming.

The assessment

as farmland constitutes a tax preference and just as the preference given to religions and charitable properties in Utah, it
should be strictly construed.

To expand it to include the

Kennecott-Hercules industrial lease for the next 25 or 40 years
would be in complete derogation of what the people voted for
when they approved the amendments to Section 3 of Article XIII,
of

the Utah

Constitution.

kennecott

Corporation

through

Hercules should not be allowed to abuse that intention.
The decision of the Tax Commission of U+-ah should be
reversed in its entirety and Salt Lake County should be allowed
to assess the subject property in the same manner as all other
taxable property in Salt Lake County that is not actively
devoted to agricultural use.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of January, 1988.
DAVID E. YOCUM
Salt Lake County Attorney
BILL THOMAS PETERS
Speci^i^Deputy County Attorney

TLLL "THOMAS' PETERS
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1
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ARTICLE XIII. REVENUE AND TAXATION
Sec. 1. [Fiscal year.]
The fiscal year shall begin on the first day of
January, unless changed by the Legislature.
1896
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value
ascertained — Exemption of state and
municipal property — Exemption of tangible
personal property held for sale or processing —
Exemption of property used for irrigating land
— Exemption of property used for electrical
power — Remittance or abatement of taxes of
poor — Exemption of residential and household
property — Disabled veterans' exemption —
Intangible property — Legislature to provide
annual tax for state.]
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under this
Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and equal
rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and
public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special
districts, and all other political subdivisions of the
state, except that to the extent and in the manner
provided by the Legislature the property of a county,
city, town, special district or other political subdivision
of the state located outside of its geographic boundaries
as defined by law may be subject to the ad valorem
property tax;

64

(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is
used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or
corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined
by statute. This exemption shall be implemented over
a period of time as provided by statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on
January 1, m., which is held for sale or processing and
which is shipped to final destination outside this state
within twelve months may be deemed by law to have
acquired no situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem
property taxation and may be exempted by law from
such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or
produced or otherwise originating within or without
the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on
January 1, m., held for sale in the ordinary course of
business and which constitutes the inventory of any
retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or
livestock raiser may be deemed for purposes of ad
valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and
flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations
for irrigating land within the state owned by such
individuals or corporations, or the individual members
thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent
that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other
property used for generating and delivering electrical
power, a portion of which is used for furnishing power
for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in
the state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to
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the extent that such property is used for such purposes.
These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as
the Legislature may prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at
such times and in such manner as may be provided by
law.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the
exemption from taxation, of not to exceed 45% of the
fair market value of residential property as defined by
law, and all household furnishings, furniture, and
equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at
his place of abode m maintaining a home for himself
and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served
in any war m the military service of the United States
or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried widows
and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of
persons who while serving in the military service of
the United States or the state of Utah were killed in
action or died as a result of such service may be
exempted as the Legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from
taxation as property or it may be taxed as property in
such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may
provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom
shall not also be taxed. Provided that if intangible
property is taxed as property the rate thereof shall not
exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an
annual tax sufficient, with other sources of revenue, to
defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state for
each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state
debt, if any there be, the Legislature shall provide for
levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the annual
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mterest and to pay the principal of such debt, within
twenty years from the final passage of the law creating
the debt.
January 1,1931
November 5, 1946
January 1,1959
January 1,1963
January 1,1965
January 1,1969
January 1, 1983
Sea 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property
— Livestock — Land used for agricultural
purposes.]
(l)The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property
in the state, according to its value in money, except as
otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such
property, so that every person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its
tangible property, provided that the Legislature may
determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.
(2)Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the
Legislature prescribes, be assessed according to its
value for agricultural use without regard to the value it
may have for other purposes.
November 6,1900
November 6,1906
January 1,1931
November 5,1946
January 1,1969
January 1,1983
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59-2-501.

Revenue and Taxation

59-2-515. Rules prescribed by commission.
59-2-501. Short title.
This part is known as theTarmiand Assessment
Act."
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59-2-502. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Land in agricultural use" means:
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants
and animals, such as:
(i) forages and sod crops;
(ii) grains and feed crops;
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2102(8)(d);
(iv) trees and fruits; or
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications for payments or other compensation under a crop-land retirement program
with an agency of the state or federal government.
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the
withdrawal of the land from the provisions of this
part or the change in use of the land, not to exceed
five years, during which the land is valued, assessed,
and taxed under this part.
1987
59-2-503. Qualifications for agricultural use
valuation.
(1) For general property tax purposes, the value
of land under this part is the value which the land
has for agricultural use if the land:
(a) is not less than five contiguous acres in area,
except where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible acreage or as provided
under Subsection (3);
(b) has a gross income from agricultural use,
not including rental income, of at least $1000 per
year;
(c) is actively devoted to agricultural use; and
(d) has been devoted to agricultural use for at
least two successive years immediately preceding the
tax year in issue.
(2) Land which (a) is subject to the privilege tax
imposed by Section 59-4-101, (b) is owned by the
state or any of its political subdivisions, and (c)
meets the requirements of Subsection (1), is eligible
for assessment based on its agricultural value.
(3) The commission may grant a waiver of the
acreage limitation, upon appeal by the owner and
submission of proof that 80% or more of the
owner's, purchaser's, or lessee's income is derived
from agricultural products produced on the property
in question.
(4)(a) The commission may grant a waiver of the
income limitation for the tax year in issue, upon
appeal by the owner and submission of proof that
the land was valued on the basis of agricultural use
for at least two years immediately preceding that tax
year, and that the failure to meet the income requirements for that tax year was due to no fault or act
of the owner, purchaser, or lessee.
(b) As used in this section, "fault" does not
include the intentional planting of crops or trees
which, because of the maturation period, do not
give the owner, purchaser, or lessee a reasonable
opportunity to satisfy the income requirement.
im
59-2-504. Application requirements - Change in
land use or withdrawal.
(1) The owner of land eligible for valuation under
this part shall submit an application to the county
assessor of the county in which the land is located.
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UTAH CODE
UTAH CODE 1987-1988
1987-198$

Rev

Applications shall be accepted if filed prior to by Subsection (1), the attachment of the
March 1 of the tax year in which valuation under| these taxes, and the right of the owner
this part is first requested. Any application submi. interested party to review any judgmen
tted after January 1 is subject to a $25 late filing] county board of equalization affecting
fee. Filing fees shall be paid to the county treasurer back tax, shall be governed by the proced
at the time the application is filed. AH applications vided for the assessment and taxation of i
filed under this subsection shall be recorded by the] erty not valued, assessed, and taxed under
The roll-back tax collected shall be paid
county recorder.
county treasury and paid by the treasur
(2) Once valuation under this part has been app various taxing units pro rata in accordanci
roved, the owner is not required either to file again! levies for the current year.
or give any notice to the county assessor, until a) 59-2-507. Exclusions from agricultural use
change in the land use occurs. Failure of the owner!
to notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back! assessment - Assessment of excluded stn
tax imposed by Section 59-2-506 within 90 days| and land.
(1) Land under barns, sheds, silos, crit
after any change in land use subjects the owner to
ouses and like structures, lakes, dam
penalty of lOOVo of the roll-back tax due.
(3) Any change in land use or other withdrawal oi streams, and irrigation ditches and like 1
land from the provisions of this part subjects thcj included in determining the total area of
land to the roll-back tax whether the change orj vely devoted to agricultural use. Land
withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless thej under the farmhouse and land used in
change in use or other withdrawal is due to ineligi with the farmhouse, is excluded from tfu
bility resulting solely from amendments to this part. nation.
(4) Land which becomes exempt from taxation! (2) All structures which are located <
under Article XIII, Sec. 2, Utah Constitution, is not! agricultural use, the farmhouse and th
considered withdrawn from this part if the landl which the farmhouse is located, and la
continues to be used for agricultural purposes. 1987| connection with the farmhouse, shall
assessed, and taxed using the same
59-2-505. Indicia of value for agricultural use
methods, and procedures that apply to oi
assessment - Inclusion of fair market value on
structures and other land in the county.
tax notice.
If valuing land which qualifies as land actively! 59-2-508. Application -Consent to audit i
devoted to agricultural use under the test prescribed review - Purchaser's or lessee's affidav
by Subsection 59-2-503(1), and for which the] (1) Any application for valuation, asse
owner has made a timely application for valuation taxation of land in agricultural use sh
assessment, and taxation under this part for the taxi form prescribed by the commission, ai
year in issue, the assessor shall consider only those for the use of the applicants by the coui
indicia of value which the land has for agricultural The application shall provide for the
use as determined by the commission. The assessor information pertinent to this part. A cei
shall also include the fair market value assessment the owner that the facts set forth in th<
on the tax notice. The county board of equalization! are true may be prescribed by the comm
shall review the agricultural use value and fair of a sworn statement to that effect. S
market value assessments each year as provided) certified are considered as if made unc
under Section 59-2-1001.
1987J subject to the same penalties as provide
perjury.
59-2-506. Roll-back tax - Recordation - Lien
(2) All owners applying for partici]
- Computation of tax - Equalization,
this part and all purchasers or lessees J
collection, and distribution.
(1) If land which is or has been in agricultural! avits under Subsection (3) arc consid
use, and is or has been valued, assessed, and taxed] given their consent to field audit and re
under this part, is applied to a use other than agri the commission and the county a
cultural or is otherwise withdrawn from the provis consent is a condition to the accept
ions of this part, it is subject to an additional taxi application or affidavit.
referred to as the "roll-back tax," and the owner| (3) Any owner of lands eligible f
shall, within 90 days after the change in land use assessment, and taxation under this pj
notify the county assessor of the change in land use use of that land by, and the gross inc
ations of, a purchaser or lessee, may
and pay the roll-back tax.
(2) Upon receipt of the notice, the county assessor! lands by submitting, together with tl
shall cause the following statement to be recorded! under Subsection (1), an affidavit fro
by the county recorder: "On ( date ) this land aser or lessee certifying those facts i
became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by use of the land and the purchaser's oi
income which would be necessary fo
Section 59-2-506."
(3) The roll-back tax is a lien upon the land untii of those lands under this part.
paid, and is due and payable at the time of the 59-2-509. Change of ownership.
Continuance of valuation, assessnr
change in use.
(4) The assessor shall determine the amount of the lion under this part depends upon c
roll-back tax by computing the difference between the land in agricultural use and comp
the tax paid while the land was valued under thi<< other requirements of this part, and
part, and that which would have been paid had the tinuance in the same owner of titli
property not been valued under this part. The Liability to the roll-back tax attj
county treasurer shall collect the roll-back tax and change in use or other withdrawa
certify to the county recorder that the roll-back tax occurs, but not when a change in o\
title takes place, if the new owner \
lien on the property has been satisfied.
(5) The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed nues the land in agricultural use un
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59-5-89

REVENUE AND TAXATION

lessee obtains 80% or more of his income from agricultural products on an area
of less than five contiguous acres.
(3) The tax commission may grant a waiver of the income limitation for the
tax year in issue, upon appeal by the owner and submission of proof that the land
has been valued on the basis of agricultural use for at least two years immediately
preceding that tax year, and that the failure to meet the income requirements for
that tax year was due to no fault or act of the owner or a purchaser or lessee,
whether that act is one of omission or commission. "Fault" shall not be construed
to include the intentional planting of crops or trees which because of the
maturation period of such crops or trees prevent the owner, purchaser, or lessee
from achieving the income limitation.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-87, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 2; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 1; 1975,
ch. 174, § 1.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment inserted the subsection (1) designation; substituted "gross
income, not including rental income, of $1000

per year" in subsec. (1) for "gross income of
$250 per year"; substituted "at least two successive years" for "at least five successive
years" in subsec. (1); redesignated former
subd
- <a> a s subsec - W> inserted "or a purchaser or lessee" in subsec. (2); added subsec.
(3); and made minor changes in phraseology.

59-5-89. Land actively devoted to agricultural use — Additional requirements — Application for assessment under act — Change in land use — Land
used for religious or charitable purposes. Land which is actively devoted to agricultural use is eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation each year it meets
the following qualifications:
(1) It has been so devoted for at least the two successive years immediately
preceding the tax year for which valuation under this act is requested;
(2) The area of land is not less than five contiguous acres when measured in
accordance with the provisions of section 59-5-94, except where devoted to agricultural use in conjunction with other eligible acreage, and when the gross sales of
agricultural products produced thereon together with any payments received under
a crop-land retirement program have averaged at least $1000 per year, not including rental income, during the two year period immediately preceding the tax year
in issue; and
(3) (a) Application by the owner of the land for valuation hereunder is submitted on or before January 1 of the tax year to the county assessor in which the
land is situated on the form prescribed by the state tax commission. The county
assessor shall continue to accept applications filed within 60 days after January
1 upon payment of a late filing fee in the amount of $25, which shall be paid to
the county treasurer.
(b) The county assessor shall have all applications filed under subsection (a)
recorded by the county recorder. All necessary filing fees shall be paid by the
owner at the time his application is filed. Whenever land, which is or has been
in agricultural use and is or has been valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act, is applied to a use other than agricultural, the owner shall, within
90 days thereafter, notify the county assessor and pay the roll-back tax imposed
by section 59-5-91. Upon receipt of notice, unless payment of the roll-back tax
accompanies that notice, the county assessor shall cause the following statement
to be recorded by the county recorder: "On the
day of
, 19
,
this land became subject to the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91."
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of (3)(a) and (b) of this section, whenever
the owner of land has filed or becomes eligible for valuation under this act, he
need not file again or give any notice to the county assessor until a change in the
land use occurs. Failure of the owner to notify the county assessor and pay the
roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, within 90 days after any change in land
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use, will subject the owner to a penalty of 100% of the computed roll-back tax
due.
(d) Any change in land use or other withdrawal of land from the provisions
of this act shall be subject to the provisions of this section whether the change
or withdrawal is voluntary or involuntary, unless the change in use is due to ineligibility resulting solely from amendments to this act.
(e) Land which becomes exempt from taxation as provided in section 59-2-30
shall not be considered withdrawn from the provisions of this act as long as the
land continues to be used for agricultural purposes.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-89, enacted by L. inserted "All necessary filing fees shall be
1969, ch. 180, § 4; L. 1973, ch. 137, § 2; 1975, paid by the owner at the time his application
ch. 174, § 2; 1982, ch. 68, § 1.
\a filed" in subd. (3)(b); substituted "the
Compiler's Notes.
owner shall, within ninety days thereafter,
The 1975 amendment reduced the land use n o t i f y the county assessor and pay the rollrequirement in subd. (1) from five to two sue- D a c * tax imposed by section 59-5-91. Upon
cessive years; inserted "except where devoted receipt of notice, unless payment of the rollto agricultural use in conjunction with other back tax accompanies that notice" in subd.
eligible acreage" in subd. (2); substituted (3)(b) for "the owner shall notify the county
"averaged at least $1000 per year, not includ- assessor"; inserted "and pay the roll-back tax
ing rental income, during the two-year i m p o s e d by section 59-5-91, within ninety
period in subd. (2) for averaged at least d
„ . s u b d (3)( } a d d e d s u b d (3)(d) a n d
J
$250 per year during the five-year period
,
.
i.
• i.
i
m
e
chang
substituted "on or before January 1 of the
** "
f i n P h f ? eolo ey- u .
T h e 19 2
tax year" for "on or before October 1 of the
.
° amendment deleted as herein
year immediately preceding the tax year" in provided" after "taxation" in the first senthe first sentence of subd. (3)(a) and "Janu- tence; added subd. (3)(e); and made minor
ary 1" for "October 1" in the second sentence; changes in phraseology and style.
59-5-90. "Indicia of value" for agricultural use determined by tax commission. The assessor in valuing land which qualifies as land actively devoted to agricultural use under the test prescribed by this act, and as to which the owner
thereof has made timely application for valuation, assessment and taxation hereunder for the tax year in issue, shall consider only those indicia of value which such
land has for agricultural use as determined by the state tax commission. The
county board of equalization shall review the assessments each year as provided
in section 59-7-1.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-90, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 5; L. 1975, ch. 174, § 3.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment made no change in
this section.

59-5-92. "Roll-back tax" — Lien — Right to review judgment — Procedure.
The assessment of the roll-back tax imposed by section 59-5-91, the attachment of
the lien for such taxes, and the right of the owner or other interested party to
review any judgment of the county board of equalization affecting such roll-back
tax, shall be governed by the procedures provided for the assessment and taxation
of real property not valued, assessed and taxed under the provisions of this act.
The roll-back tax collected shall be paid into the county treasury and paid by the
treasurer to the various taxing units pro rata in accordance with the levies for
the current year.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-92, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 7; L. 1975, ch. 174, § 4.

Compiler's Notes.
The 1975 amendment made no change in
this section.

59-5-95. Application forms — Certification by landowner — Consent to
audit and review — Purchaser's or lessee's affidavit. (1) Application for valuation, assessment and taxation of land in agricultural use under this act shall be
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Chapter 4. Privilege Tax
59-4-101. Tax basis - Exceptions - Assessment and
collection.
59-4-102. Failure to pay tax - Remedies of county.

59-5-101.

tioned in the warrant and, in the appropriate
columns, the amount of tax, penalties, interest, and
other costs for which the warrant is issued and the
date when the warrant is filed. The warrant so
docketed has the force and effect of a judgment
duly rendered by a district court and docketed in the
office of the clerk, and the county has the same
remedies against the possessor or user as any other
judgment creditor.
im

59-4-101. Tax basis - Exceptions - Assessment
and collection.
(1) A tax is imposed on the possession or other
beneficial use enjoyed by any person of any real or
Chapter 5. Mining Occupation Tax
personal property which for any reason is exempt
59-5-101. Definitions.
from taxation, if that property is used in connection
59-5-102. Occupation tax - Rate - Computation with a business conducted for profit.
Annual exemption.
(2) The tax imposed under this chapter is the same
59-5-103. Application to taxable years.
amount that the ad valorem property tax would be
59-5-104. Statements filed • Contents - Verification if the possessor or user were the owner of the proFalsification as perjury.
perty. The amount of any payments which are made
59-5-105. Failure to file statement - Liability of owners
of oil, gas, and other hydrocarbon substances.
in lieu of taxes is credited against the tax imposed
59-5-106. Interest and penalty.
on the beneficial use of propety owned by the
59-5-107. Date tax due - Extensions • Installment
federal government.
payments • Penalty on delinquencies • Audit • Cost.
(3) No tax is imposed under this chapter on the
59-5-108. Tax as lien on property or oil and gas
following:
production interests.
(a) the use of property which is a concession in,
59-5-109. Notice of amount of tax.
or relative to, the use of a public airport, park,
59-5-110. (Effective through December 31, 1987).
fairground, or similar property which is available as
Hearings for correction of amount of tax.
59-5-110. (Effective January 1, 1988). Adjudicative
a matter of right to the use of the general public;
proceedings for correction of amount of tax.
(b) the use or possession of property by a reli59-5-111. Decisions of commission.
gious, educational, or charitable organization;
59-5-112. (Effective through December 31, 1987).
(c) the use or possession of property where the
Condition precedent to appeal to tax division of district
proceeds inure to the benefit of a religious, educatcourt.
ional, or charitable organization and not to the
59-5-112. (Effective January 1, 1988). Condition
benefit of any other person;
precedent to judicial review.
(d) the possession or other beneficial use of
59-5-113. Failure to pay tax - Warrant.
59-5-114. Collection by warrant.
public land occupied under the terms of a grazing
59-5-115. Limitation of actions.
lease or permit issued by the United States or this
59-5-116. Application of act to taxable years.
state; or
59-5-117. Disposition of taxes collected • Credit to
(e) the use or possession of any lease, permit,
General Fund.
or easement unless the lease, permit, or easement
59-5-118. Transfer of moneys in former occupation tax
entitles the lessee or permittee to exclusive possesreserve fund.
sion of the premises to which the lease, permit, or
easement relates. Every lessee, permittee, or other
59-5-101. Definitions.
holder of a right to remove or extract the mineral
As used in this chapter:
covered by the holder's lease, right, permit, or
(1) ''Person" includes any individual, partnership,
easement except from brines of the Great Salt Lake,
company, joint stock company, corporation, assois considered to be in possession of the premises,
ciation, or any group or combination acting as a
notwithstanding the fact that other parties may have
unit, and the plural as well as the single number.
a similar right to remove or extract another mineral
(2) "Metalliferous minerals" is defined in Subsefrom the same lands or estates.
ction 59-2-102(4).
(4) A tax imposed under this chapter is assessed to
(3) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" is defined in
the possessors or users of the property on the same
Subsection 59-2-102(7).
forms, and collected and distributed at the same
(4) "Minerals" means either metalliferous or
time and in the same manner, as taxes assessed
nonmetalliferous minerals, or both.
owners, possessors, or other claimants of property
(5) "Mine" is defined in Subsection 59-2which is subject to ad valorem property taxation.
102(5).
The tax is not a lien against the property, and no
(6) "Mining" is defined in Subsection 59-2tax-exempt property may be attached, encumbered,
102(6).
sold, or otherwise affected for the collection of the
(7) "Solid hydrocarbons" includes coal, gilsonite,
tax.
19*7
ozocerite, elaterite, oil shale, tar sands, and all other
59-4-102. Failure to pay tax - Remedies of
hydrocarbon substances that occur naturally in solid
county.
form.
A tax due and unpaid under this chapter constit(8) "Well or wells" means any well or wells or
utes a debt due the county for and on behalf of the
other extractive means from which oil, gas, or other
various taxing units concerned with the tax. If the
hydrocarbon substances (except solid hydrocarbons)
tax imposed by this chapter or any portion of the
are produced or extracted, located within an oil field
tax is not paid at the time the tax becomes delinqor gas field as defined in Subsection (9), and operuent, the county auditor may issue a warrant in the ated by one person.
name of the county directed to the clerk of the dis(9) "Oil field," or "gas field," means any field in
trict court for that county. The clerk shall enter in
which oil, gas, or other hydrocarbon substances
the judgment docket, in the column for judgment
(except solid hydrocarbons) are produced from one
debtors, the name of the delinquent taxpayer menor more wells within an oil or gas structure, whether
CODE• Co
Provo, U u h
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jjjrec years. The current judicial council shall contfoue in existence with full authority until the election
af the members of the council as provided m this
section
(2) The appellate court nominating commission
established by Subsection 20-1-7 2(1) may not be
eonvened initially prior to July 1, 1986 nor later
jjmit September 1, 1986
(3) The provisions in this act for court jurisdictions may not be implemented until January I, 1987
Courts then continue to have jurisdiction to dispose
of any cases pending on that date
(4)(a) Any justice or judge of a court of record,
those election to office was effective on or before
July 1, 1985, shall hold the office for the remainder
of the term to which he was elected. The justice or
judge is subject to an unopposed retention election
is provided by law at the general election lmmediitely preceding the expiration of the respective term
of office
(b) Any justice or judge of a court of record
whose appointment to office was effective on or
before July 1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed
retention election as provided by law at the first
general election held more than three years after the
date of the appointment
(c) Any justice or judge of a court of record
whose appointment to office was effective after July
I, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention election as provided by law at the first general election
held more than three years after the date of the
tppomtment
i9«6

Chapter 2. Supreme Court
U-2-1. Number of justices - Term - Retirement Chief justice and associate chief justice - Selection and
functions
ft-M.5. Repealed.
&-2-1 6. Repealed.
U-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). Supreme
Court jurisdiction.
fc-2-2 (Effective January 1, 1988) Supreme Court
jurisdiction
&-2-3. Repealed.
Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges pro
Itempore,and practice of law.
**2-5. Court always open for transaction of business.
Appellate court administrator.
£^7 through 78-2-10. Repealed.
JM1. Reporter - Deputy clerks - Assistants.
J**12 Postage and office supplies.
J&M3. Bailiffs and assistant librarian.
*M-14. Sheriffs to attend and serve.

£•1. Number of justices - Term irement - Chief justice and associate chief
ice - Selection and functions.
fl) The Supreme Court consists of five justices
•) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appH^fcd initially to serve until the first general elecn
§ ° held more than three years after the effective
?*? of the appointment Thereafter, the term of
«<* of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years
^ until his successor is appointed and approved in
t ordance with Section 20-1-7.1.
U*j The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a
t ^ Justice from among the members of the court
| J * majority vote of all justices. The term of the
L j * of chief justice is four years The chief justice
r j * n °t serve successive terms. The chief justice
|JJ* resign from the office of chief justice without
•^mng from t n e supreme Court. The chief justice

•8g?

78-2-2,

may be removed from the office of chief justice by
a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a
chief justice is elected under this section If the
associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act
as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this
section.
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has
additional duties as provided by law
(6) There is created the office of associate chief
justice. The term of office of the associate chief
justice is two years. The associate chief justice may
serve in that office no more than two successive
terms The associate chief justice shall be elected by
a majonty vote of the members of the Supreme
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief
justice decides. If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice
shall serve as chief justice. The chief justice, where
not inconsistent with law, may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief justice
19W
78-2-1.5. Repealed.
1971
78-2-1.6. Repealed.
i98i
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987).
Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary wnts and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals p n o r to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating
in:
(0 the Public Service Commission;
(H) the State Tax Commission;
(m) the Board of State Lands,
(IV) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mimng, and
(v) the state engineer;
( 0 a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution,
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital
felony;
(h) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
(l) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters*
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions;
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(b) election and voting contests,
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers,
(e) general water adjudication,
( 0 taxation and revenue, and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a)
through (h)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication,
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases
certified to it bv the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b)
1986
78-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme
Court jurisdiction.

(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
answer questions of state law certified bv a court of
the United States
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carr> into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its
jurisdiction
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of mterlocutorv appeals, over
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals,
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the
Court of Appeals,
(c) discipline of lawyers,
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission,
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating
in

d) the Public Service Commission,
(u) the State Tax Commission,
(in) the Board of State Lands,
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and
(v) the state engineer,
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its tace under the Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution,
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a cnarge of a first degree or capital
felon>,
(h) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony, and
(0 orders, judgments, and decrees of anv court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not
have original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of the matters over which the
SuDreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except for the following matters
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions,
(b) election and voting contests,
(c) reapportionment of election districts,
(d) retention or removal of public officers,
(e) general water adjudication,
(0 taxation and revenue, and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a)
through (h)
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication,
but tne Supreme Court shall review those cases
certified to it bv the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b)
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review
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of agency adjudicative proceedings
1987
78-2-3. Repealed.
im
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges
pro tempore, and practice of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the courts of the
state and shall bv rule manage the appellate process
The Legislature mav amend the rules of procedure
and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon a
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses
of the Legislature
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah
Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule ma> authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro
tempore to perform any judicial duties Judges pro
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted
to the practice of law
1986
78-2-5. Court always open for transaction o f
business.
The Supreme Court shall alwavs be open for the
transaction of business Adjournments from day to
day, or from time to time, are to be construed as
recesses in the sessions, and shall not prevent the
court from sitting at any time
1953
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
clerks and support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals The duties of the clerks and support staff
shall be established bv the appellate court administrator, and powers established bv rule of the
Supreme Court
1986
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed.
19*6
78-2-11. Reporter - Deputv clerks - Assistants.
The Supreme Court shall appoint a reporter of its
decisions who shal' hold office during the pleasure
of the court, and may appoint, remove at pleasure,
and fix the compensation for such deputy clerks and
other assistants as may be necessary for the transaction of the business of tne court
1953
78-2-12. Postage a n d office supplies.
Stationery, postage a n d supplies necessarv for the
transaction of the business of the Supreme Court,
including the printing of the court docket, shall be
furnished by the purchasing department or officer
of the state, on requisition therefor made through
the clerk
1953
78-2-13. Bailiffs and assistant librarian.
The court is herebv authorized to appoint and
remove at pleasure the necessary bailiffs to attend
the court, and to perform such other duties and
execute such orders as may be directed or made by
the court The court may also appoint and remove
at pleasure an assistant librarian, who shall perform
such duties as the court may order or direct
1953
78-2-14. Shenffs to attend and serve.
The court may at any time require the attendance
and services of anv sheriff in the state
1953

Chapter 2a. Court of Appeals
78-2a-l Court of Appeals
78-2a-2 Number of judges - Functions - Filing fees.
78-2a-3 (Effective through December 31, 1987) Court
of Appeals jurisdiction
78-2a-3 (EffecUve Januan 1, 1988) Court of Appeals
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ADDENDUM 2

EXHIBIT "A"

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION*
THOMAS E. & MARY LU E. JUDD,
Petitioner,

)
)

)
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
:
STATz. OF UTAH,
)
:
Respondent.
)

DECISION OF
INFORMAL HEARING
Appeal No. 85-1738 thru
85-1750
Serial No. See attachment

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter was appealed from the Salt Lake County
Board of Equalization's determination not to place the subject
property on greenbelt status.

A hearing was held on the matter

on March 26, 1986 before the Utah State Tax Commission.

James

E. Harvard, Hearing Officer, heard the matter for the Utah
State Tax Commission.

Thomas E. Judd was present, and the Salt

Lake County Board of Equalization was represented by Bill
Thomas Peters, Jona Schomburg, Craig Jacobsen and Colleen
Jacobsen.
Yates.

Also present on behalf of the Respondent was 3ob

Petitioner presented evidence that lots 4 through 16
of the Vista West Subdivision, although platted, are still
being used as farm ground.

The lots approximately 4 acres, are

farmed in conjunction with a larger 19 acre piece which lies to
tr.e east of the subject property.

The property brings in

approximately $300.00 an acre per year based on the hay and
grain produced from the property.

The Petitioner asserts that

where the use of the property has not changed even though it
has, in fact, been subdivided or platted for subdivision, that
the roll back taxes should not be assessed, nor should the
prDperty be taken off greenbelt status.
The property is improved with curb, gutter, streets,
telephone service, sewer, and electricity.

The back lot lines

are presently established by the telephone company's service
boxes and stubbed in electrical wiring.

All of the utilities

are underground.
During the construction of the improvements, the
contractor deposited debris and other property on the subject
lots making it difficult to farm the property.

Thus, the

property was not farmed for approximately 2 years.

A claim was

filed for destruction to the crops on the property, or crops
which would have been grown had the debris, etc. had not been
on the property.
The Respondent presented evidence that the greenbelt
status of the property no longer applies, and the roil back

-2-

Asoeal No. 85-1748 u.ru 1750

taxes should be imposed.

The basis for their conclusions were

that the curb and gutter had been in place and all improvements
had been put in.

In addition, the lets in their present

condition are weed infested, and have not been cultivated.

In

addition to this fact, it would also be very difficult to get
the machinery into the property to do any cultivating due to
the stubbed in electrical work and the teiphone lines along the
back lot line of the property.
DECISION AMD ORDER
3ased upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission makes the
ft 1 lowing determinations:
1.

The subject property has been severed from the

larger 19 acre piece to the east.
2.

The severance was accomplished by the platting of

the property, the construction and installation of the
utilities, curb, street, and gutter etc.
3.

Once property has been severed, subdivided, and

improvements placed thereon, the greenbelt status should be
removed and roll back taxes assessed according to statute
because the primary purpose of the ground is no longer for
agricultural use, but for resale.

The current economic

conditions, the inability to sell lots, and continued limited
farming activity on the property are incidental to the primary
purpose of the marketing and sales of the subdivided, platted,
and improved lots.

-3-

DEC ISION AND ORDER
Therefore, it is the Decision and Order of the Tax
Commission that the Petitioner's petition be denied and that
the actions of the Salt Lake County Assessor be affirmed.
Cj^ypy^ J.

DATED this , x^ day of

3Y ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COM^fsSION.

y.c-rk K 3uchi
Chairman

Cc.T.iss ioner
JEH/igh/2329w

/

R. H. Hansen
Commissioner

, Joe 3. Pacheco
Commiss ioner

-a-

. 1986.

